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Abstract 
Over-prescription has become one major problem in China’s healthcare sector. 
Incorporating interview data from hospitals in Shanghai, this paper provided 
empirical evidence on how the process of over-prescription was carried out in day-
to-day clinical settings, and demonstrates various mechanisms that allow over-
prescription to continue vigorously in the context of the Chinese health care system. 
In particular, this study identified four levels of incentives that over-prescription was 
carried out: hospital, medical department, doctors and pharmaceutical companies. 
Due to the insufficient funding from the government and rising operational costs, 
hospitals had to rely on the sales of drugs and provision of medical services to 
survive. This funding pressure then transferred to specific revenue targets for 
medical departments. A combination of incentives, including drug remunerations, 
bonus system, low pay and high workloads motivated over-prescription at doctor 
level. At pharmaceutical company level, high profits of pharmaceuticals products as 
well as lack of emphasis on efficacy of drugs led to under-table payments and illicit 
drug remunerations. The study argued that the way that the Chinese healthcare 
system operates was based on the profit-seeking principle rather than on fulfilling its 
social functions, and called for a systematic reform of provider incentives to 
eradicating the problem of over-prescription. 
 
Key words: over-prescription, pharmaceutical industry, provider payment incentives, 
China 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past few decades, China’s health care system has found itself to be 
increasingly subjected to negative comments. One persistent set of criticism argues 
that system-wide incentives, especially the under-subsidised health providers overly 
relying on provision of medical care and drug sales to survive, are identified as one 
fundamental cause for rapidly rising health care costs, medical impoverishment and 
unaffordable access (Yip and Hsiao 2009, 613-619; Ramesh, Wu, and HE 2012).  
 
Defined as the practice of over prescribing medicines, prescribing unnecessary and 
costly medicines, medical instruments and diagnostic procedures,  ‘over-prescription’  
is believed to lead inefficiency and poor quality in health care provision in China, 
and became a serious problem for the poor and the uninsured (Yang 2014; Yang and 
Wu 2014). A number of quantitative studies explored the causal relationship between 
provider incentives and over-prescribing practice; however, due to the nature of 
quantitative research, these studies were not able to provide an in-depth analyses of 
the issue of over-prescription or to enunciate the root causes of it (Yip and Eggleston 
2004, 267-277; Babiarz et al. 2012, 1065-1074; Babiarz et al. 2010; Yip and Hsiao 
2009, 613-619; Wagstaff et al. 2009, S7-S23; Wagstaff and Lindelow 2008, 990-
1005; Wagstaff, Yu, and World Bank. Development Research Group. Public 
Services. 2005; Yang and Wu 2014). Several qualitative studies discussed the 
relationship between payment incentives and provider behaviours, but results by far 
are still anecdotal (Yip and Hsiao 2008, 460-468; Yip and Hsiao 2009, 613-619; 
Blomqvist and Qian 2008, 5-26).  
A series of policy initiatives aiming at preventing over-prescription and correcting 
provider payment incentives were enacted in the 2000s, e.g. establishing drug 
purchasing mechanism , decoupling policy, zero mark-up policies (The State Council 
of P.R. China, 2015b; The State Council of P.R. China, 2015a; Yi et al. 2015, 1391-
1398). Evidence on the effectiveness of these policy initiatives is largely mixed. In 
order to facilitate the discussion on developing effective and feasible policy 
initiatives to overcome the issue of over-prescription, it is important to understand 
the process of over-prescription, strategies that pharmaceutical companies employ to 
motivate health providers, and how this links to medical departments as well as 
medical doctors.  
 
This paper seeks to provide an empirical investigation on the issue of over-
prescription at four levels: hospital, medical department, doctors and pharmaceutical 
companies. It first examines various funding pressures hospital faces and how 
hospital transfers these pressures to medical department. It then looks at strategies 
developed by the medical department to cope with hospital level funding pressure, as 
well as how over-prescription is motivated and carried out in clinical settings. This 
paper also explores the growing interactions with hospital and pharmaceutical 
industry. This paper incorporates fieldwork data from the city of Shanghai, where 
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thirteen semi-structured face-to-face key informant interviews were conducted from 
2008 to 2009.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows. The first section describes data collection and 
methods. The second section described empirical results concerning over-
prescription and how over-prescription was carried out at different levels, followed 
by a final section of conclusion and policy implications. 
 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Data collection 
Thirteen informants were interviewed over the period of 2008 to 2009. This study 
used the snowballing sampling technique to select informants. Eligible informants 
groups were medical doctors, pharmaceutical sales persons, and hospital directors or 
department managers in hospitals. A main reason for focusing on these groups was to 
ensure that the issue of “over-prescription” can be approached from a number of 
different perspectives to provide a balanced and holistic account. Medical doctors 
were interviewed in order to provide information on the economic pressures they 
face, the policy environment in which they operate and their understanding of what 
constitutes “good practice” as far as prescriptions are concerned. Pharmaceutical 
sales persons employed in either international or domestic pharmaceutical companies 
were also interviewed. They were asked about the nature of their interaction and on-
going relationship with medical doctors, the incentive system for employees in their 
firms and the techniques they employed to boost drug sales. Hospital directors or 
department managers interviewed included those involved in making and enforcing 
policies related to hospitals administration and, in particular, prescription drug 
dispensation. They were asked about questions related to prescription and hospital 
revenues, the interaction between hospitals and pharmaceutical companies, and their 
perceptions of the strengths and weakness of various health policies relating to 
hospital findings. Table 1 includes a profile of the informants.  
 
The informant was asked for verbal consent about being a participant upon the start 
and the end of every interview.  The process was supplemented by a Participant 
Information Sheet which included aims of the research and other details of rights of 
informants, such as confidentiality and freedom to terminate the participation at any 
point of time. Consent was obtained only after the informant fully understands the 
Participant Information Sheet. Participation is anonymous and confidential. 
 
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
2.2 Analysis 
Notes were taken during the interviews. Interviews were then transcribed. The 
transcribed data were coded thematically and analysed to discover emergent patterns 
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and themes related to over-prescription. Specifically, interview data were grouped 
into four levels (e.g., hospital, medical department, doctors and pharmaceutical 
companies) as discussed in the introduction section.  Data were then coded to 
identify themes and key findings for each level. Themes from each level were then 
used for generating an overall picture of the process of over-prescription. The themes 
were further elucidated by focusing on the process and root causes of over-
prescription and its implications at different levels of stakeholders.  
 
3. Empirical results 
Thirteen in-depth interviews were conducted. The participants’ quotes are presented 
in italics. Considerable consistency between most interviewees’ accounts, including 
hospital directors, medical doctors, and pharmaceutical sales representatives, was 
found. This section draws out the most important, commonly agreed themes across 
the different groups interviewed. 
 
The process of over-prescription and over-use of health services can be understood 
from four interrelated level, i.e. hospital level, medical department level, doctor level 
and pharmaceutical company level. As illustrated in Figure 1, due to the insufficient 
funding from the government and rising operational costs, hospitals have to rely on 
the sales of drugs and provision of medical services to survive. This funding pressure 
then transferred to specific revenue targets for medical departments. A combination 
of incentives, including drug remunerations, bonus system, low pay and high 
workloads motivate over-prescription at doctor level. It is worth noticing that at 
pharmaceutical company level, high profits of pharmaceuticals products as well as 
lack of emphasis on efficacy of drugs leads to under-table payments and illicit drug 
remunerations. The following section provides detailed evidence of the process.  
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
3.1 Funding pressures for hospitals 
Insufficient funding from central and local governments 
The first layer of incentives of over-prescription came from funding pressures that 
hospitals face. As suggested by the informants, hospitals revenues were mainly from 
two sources: government subsidies and user fees. The former partially covered 
capital, labour, and intermediate costs, and were subsidised by “central government, 
city government, and district government” (Hospital director). However, only a small 
fraction of total revenues were from by the government, as noted by a hospital 
director: “In my hospitals, only 20% of the total revenues are from the government; 
(revenues from) pharmaceuticals and medical service accounts for 50% and more…”  
 
Funding pressure was suggested as one major financial difficulty faced by the 
hospital. One common problem raised by hospital directors was that the local 
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government lack incentives to invest in health care sector because “health care is of 
low priority in local government’s funding agenda”. As noted by an informant:  
“I think the biggest problem is that there is not enough money for healthcare 
sector. It is also related to whether health care is a policy focus of the local 
government. I remember that in the past the government would allocate 
certain percentages (of their budget) to subsidise healthcare sector, but now 
it seems there is no such policy… At least in my district, hospitals are almost 
financially independent.” (Hospital director) 
 
It was not uncommon to see that public hospitals faced financial difficulty. One 
informant revealed a story that a township health centre was “in great debt and was 
almost closed”. As he added: “Pharmaceutical companies refused to supply drugs. 
The government had to help the hospital to pay for the money they owed”. He also 
emphasised that “this is not a special case, and another hospital had similar problem 
in surviving” (Hospital director).  
 
The accounts from the informants illustrated that funding issues were commonly 
faced by health facilities. Government subsidies were far from enough to support 
hospitals, and hospitals had to rely on other means to generate revenues. 
 
Rising recurrent costs for hospitals 
Apart from insufficient government subsidies, hospitals also encountered problems 
in coping with growing costs. Capital costs, which normally include building new 
wards, purchasing medical equipment and other related costs, constituted a 
significant proportion of the overall cost increase. As pointed out by an informant:  
“Related expenses are increasing…. The profit (earned by the hospitals) 
actually dropped a lot…The space for hospital development is limited by not 
having enough money. As we all know, in order to expand, hospitals have 
plans for expanding the existing facilities and purchasing more medical 
equipment, but now hospitals have to pay for these themselves…We need to 
add depreciation costs for our equipment and other expenses…This made 
was very difficult for most of district and township hospitals.”(Hospital 
director) 
 
Informants also mentioned that labour costs were becoming increasingly expensive.  
A hospital director, noted: “According to the government’s policy, staff’s salary must 
increase every year. It has been really difficult for us. A lot of district hospitals are 
losing profits. Although the government subsidises us, it is not enough.” (Hospital 
director) 
    
Because of insufficient funding and growing running costs, many hospitals faced the 
problem of the shrink of the net profits, which led to the dreadful situation of under-
funding. According to the informant: 
7 
 
 “Hospital revenue was 4-5 million RMB a few years ago. Now it is 8.5 
million RMB. It seems that the revenues are increasing, but actually it is not 
true. The net profit is decreasing, because other related expenses are simply 
too expensive.” (Hospital director) 
 
3.2 Setting sales target for individual medical departments  
The responses from hospital directors suggested that the funding issue was a major 
problem for hospitals. Unsurprisingly, in order to compensate for the loss of 
healthcare subsidies and to secure enough funds for expansion and development, 
hospitals were encouraged to generate revenues from drug sales and provision of 
services. As indicated by a number of informants, the actual practice of making 
profits from pharmaceutical sales and care provision was through mechanisms of 
assigning revenue targets for medical departments, and linking doctors’ salary with 
bonus.  
 
Generating sales revenues from pharmaceuticals and medical services was 
commonly referred as ‘using pharmaceuticals to feed hospitals’—a practice which 
all medical staff were aware of and made to follow.  This is mainly because that costs 
for basic health services were set low, hospitals tend to over-prescribe or overuse 
diagnostic procedures to cross-subsidize the basic medical treatment. As suggested 
by a medical doctor: 
“We, healthcare practitioners all know ‘pharmaceuticals feed hospitals’. 
Most of the profits in hospitals are from the sales of pharmaceuticals and the 
provision of medical services. How much bonus we receive depends on how 
much pharmaceutical sales and medical services revenue we generate… 
Mostly it is the pharmaceuticals (that accounts for a large portion of the 
hospitals)”. (Medical doctor) 
 
One noticeable strategy employed by most hospitals in Shanghai was to set up 
revenue targets for individual medical departments. As suggested by a number of 
informants, the revenue provided by each individual medical department’s were 
reviewed quarterly, which gave pressure for the manager as well as doctors in that 
department. One informant stated: 
“We have targets for each quarter, and we have to fulfil it to generate enough 
profits. There are regular meetings in the hospital. We discuss which medical 
department is not doing well in terms of meeting targets. We, doctors, all 
want to generate profits, and the hospital wants to generate more profits as 
well.” (Department manager) 
 
Since each individual department had its own revenue target, doctors were 
encouraged to prescribe more drugs or to encourage the patients to undergo thorough 
physical examines in order to fulfil the hospital targets. Another informant also 
provided similar account: “The income of the department is from drug prescription 
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and the provision of medical services. In order to fulfil the department target, we will 
encourage most patients to undergo thorough physical examinations before any 
diagnoses are made. This is required by the department.” (Medical doctor)  
 
3.3 Incentives for over-prescription for medical doctors 
Hospital bonus system 
At the doctor’s level, vigorous mechanisms were established in conformity with the 
funding issues. Apart from the salaries, doctors received bonus, which was linked to 
the amount of drugs they prescribed and revenues generated by the medical 
department. As noted by a doctor:  
“My bonus is associated with the performance of the department…My bonus 
was paid quarterly. This quarter is around 2500RMB; sometimes I receive 
more if the department target is met…” (Medical doctor) 
 
Similar account was provided by a surgeon. The average bonus for his department 
was “higher compared with other department” because they usually “had more 
patients than others.” He also mentioned that doctors in some departments, for 
example, Orthopaedics, may “receive even higher bonus because they have more 
patients”. The amount of bonus a doctor earns can be up to “twice as much as the 
basic salaries”. (Medical doctor) 
 
The responses from the doctors demonstrated how a mechanism had been set up to 
motivate prescription. Hospitals can barely maintain or develop itself if it did not 
provide care for profits. Sales of pharmaceutical products and provision of services 
became hospitals’ strategies to generate profits and to guarantee patient flow, which 
was based on the profit-seeking principle rather than on fulfilling its social functions.  
 
Use bonus and drug remunerations to compensate low pay 
One important reason for the bonus system to work was because that bonus 
constituted a significant proportion of doctor’s income. A number of medical doctors 
expressed their discontent towards their salaries. Most of them agreed that their 
salary level cannot reflect their knowledge and skills.  Their salaries were “low” 
compared with people who “worked for private companies”. Some of them also think 
that their work was “labour-intensive” given the fact that “it was common to do night 
shifts”. As suggested by a surgeon:  
“I am always very busy at work. I have so many patients to attend to. It is 
common for me to do a 5-6 hours operation. The hospital always calls me for 
emergency situations because they cannot find any senior people. ” (Medical 
doctor) 
 
When being asked about the salaries, the informant expressed discontent:  
“My basic salary is around 4600RMB per month. I know this basic salary is 
the same for all doctors in Shanghai hospitals at my level and working 
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experience. Given the high living costs in Shanghai… the basic salary is not 
enough to pay for a decent life”.  
 
Similar account was provided by a medical doctor:  
“(Medical doctors) is a job that requires years of training and deals with lots 
of risks. But their salaries, compared with their foreign counterparts are 
quite low… People laughed at them and said, ‘scalpels do even not value as 
much as a barber’s scissors’. Do you think this is fair?” 
 
The narratives provided by the informants suggested that there was a general 
discontent among the doctors towards their basic salaries and high workloads. Most 
of the informants agreed that their basic salaries should increase to match with the 
training they had and the workload of their jobs.  
 
3.3 Incentives from pharmaceutical companies 
High profits of pharmaceutical products  
As commonly noted by the medical doctors and pharmaceutical companies, drugs 
were still priced high in terms of the actual costs. Pharmacies owned and run by 
hospitals were allowed to sell drugs at a mark-up of 15% and these profits were non-
taxable. As noted by another informant:  
“Hospitals receive most of the profit (from drug sales). For example, the cost 
for producing a bottle of N (a name of a western medicine) is about 4RMB, 
we sell it to our distributors at a price of 28.77RMB. The hospital sells it at 
40RMB.” (Pharmaceutical sales representative) 
 
Similar accounts were provided by another informant: 
“Generally, the profit of a drug could be divided into three parts. The profit 
for the pharmaceutical company is around 5-15% of the wholesale price, and 
10-30% for the hospital.” (Pharmaceutical sales representative) 
 
It is also noted that  because of the high profit margin of drugs, most pharmaceutical 
sales representatives have a budget known as “promotion budget” or “clinical 
budget”, which can be used for “developing business relationship with hospital staff”, 
“paying drug remunerations”, and other drug promotion methods (Pharmaceutical 
sales representative).  
 
Developing business relationship with hospital staff 
In order to market their drugs, pharmaceutical sales representatives approach doctors 
by using their personal connections. Common strategies as mentioned by the 
informants included “ask friends, relatives, colleagues and classmates to introduce 
them to doctors, and it was often very difficult to for the doctor to refuse to see 
them.” (Hospital director) 
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Informants from pharmaceutical sectors suggested that maintaining a personal 
relationship with medical staff was the key to promote the sales of their products. 
Sales persons often treated doctors as close friends, and socialised them after work. 
They knew their families and helped to manage matters even these are unrelated to 
their work. As learned from a pharmaceutical sales representative: 
“Most of the time, my job is to deal with medical doctors. I approach 
them, introduce the drugs to them. I need to know their needs, their 
family, even their personal likings.  I give them presents, money or other 
things that will please them, hoping that they will prescribe more 
medicines from my company not others.” (Pharmaceutical sales 
representative) 
 
Another pharmaceutical sales representative stated: 
“As for me, I gave doctors cash, sometimes other gifts. It depends on the 
doctors; I heard my colleague even bought branded skin care products 
for female doctors.” (Pharmaceutical sales representative) 
 
Strategies used by pharmaceutical companies to maintain business relationship 
with doctors included “playing pokers with them” and “picking up their kids 
from school” (Pharmaceutical sales representatives). 
 
The responses from the informants showed that pharmaceutical sales persons were 
persistent in approaching medical doctors and promoting their products. Interestingly, 
none of these informants mentioned about the efficacy of their medicines. The nature 
of their work was to maintain a good relationship with doctors and to sell drugs 
rather than promoting the drugs for their efficacy.  
 
Offering drug remunerations  
The most widely adopted strategy by pharmaceutical companies to motivate 
prescription was to offer direct drug commissions on each prescription. However, in 
order to sell drugs in a hospital, the approval of the Hospital Pharmaceutical 
Committee (yao shi wei yuan hui) was required. The committee is usually 
“comprised of the director of the pharmacy department, the vice hospital president, 
directors from various medical departments, and some other specialists” 
(Pharmaceutical sales representative). Decisions made by these individuals were 
crucial in determining whether the drug can be sold in the hospital. Pharmaceutical 
sales persons offered members of the pharmaceutical committee money or gifts to 
establish a good personal relationship. As noted by a pharmaceutical sales 
representative:   
“The most important thing is to know who are the key persons in the 
committee (Hospital Pharmaceutical Committee)… Targeting the 
right persons is the key. The second step is to persuade the persons 
to speak for you at the meeting. We offer money... It is possible that 
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the first time they will reject you… in the end, they will accept your 
money.” (Pharmaceutical sales representative)  
 
Approaching key figures from the hospital pharmaceutical committee and 
persuading them to use the drugs in their hospitals was important, and a 
common strategy is to offer them economic incentives. A pharmaceutical 
sales representative provided a similar account:  
“We need to make sure that my company is maintaining a good 
relationship with these people (members from Pharmaceutical 
Committee), and offering money to them.... Some medicines need a lot 
of money to get listed in a hospital, especially for Chinese 
medicines.” (Pharmaceutical sales representative) 
 
After a drug was listed in a hospital, the next step was to convince doctors 
to prescribe it. The most widely adopted strategy by pharmaceutical 
companies was to offer medical doctors drug commissions on each 
prescription. As noted by a pharmaceutical sales representative, a large 
proportion of doctor’s income could come from drug remunerations, 
“In Shanghai, a doctor work in outpatient clinics in a Class III hospital1 can 
earn up to 50,000RMB a month from pharmaceutical companies. Drug 
remunerations are paid monthly based on how much the doctor prescribes.” 
(Pharmaceutical sales representative) 
 
Aside from drugs, remunerations from medical device are also lucrative. A 
pharmaceutical sales representative gave a vivid example of how remuneration is 
paid:  
“Commissions for imported intravascular stents are around 2,000RMB per 
unit... Some patients need more than one intravascular stents, maybe four or 
five stents...Usually commissions are around 20% of the listed price. We give 
the commissions to the whole surgery team, and let them split the money 
themselves…Commissions for domestic intravascular stents can be up to 40% 
of the listed price....” 
 
Other ways of offering drug remunerations included “fees for inviting doctors to give 
lectures” (Pharmaceutical sales representative). As suggested by pharmaceutical 
sales representatives, drugs remunerations can also be paid through other means. For 
instance, instead of offering direct cash payment, drugs remunerations were often 
paid in the form of fees for academic lecture:  
“Sometimes, a doctor does not need to give a lecture. We issue a receipt 
under a title of ‘fees for academic lectures’. We will transfer the money to the 
doctor as a way to pay for drug remunerations. This way, everything is 
legal.” (Pharmaceutical sales representative) 
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Doctors were also asked whether they knew or even accepted any drug 
remunerations. Some of them said that they never accepted drug remunerations. 
Some of them insisted that the prescription was based on the efficacy of the drug 
rather than remuneration, and drug remunerations did not influence prescription 
decisions.  Others pointed out that some doctors may prescribe for remunerations: 
“The point is the profit is just there. Even doctors do not take it; the money 
will go into the sales’ pocket. However, there are some medical doctors who 
are deeply corrupted. For some personal profit, they will harm the 
patients…Doctors may choose to use the most expensive medical products 
and imported medicines just for drug remunerations. But not all of us will do 
it.”(Department manager) 
 
These responses suggested that accepting drug remunerations was a common 
practice in Chinese hospitals, and drug remunerations can take various forms. Even 
though accepting any form of drug commission may be illicit, it was widely adopted.  
 
Overlooking the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of pharmaceutical products 
The prescription of drug should depend on the efficacy of the product, but responses 
from pharmaceutical sales representatives seldom mentioned about the efficacy of 
their products. For instance, branded drugs were usually much more expensive than 
the generics after the patent expires. As noted by a pharmaceutical sales 
representative, the most common strategy is to “offer doctor remunerations” to 
encourage the prescription branded drugs, even though “the efficacy of the drugs are 
same.”(Pharmaceutical sales representative)  
 
One commonly noted theme is that not all drugs were prescribed at a cost-effective 
manner. Pharmaceutical products with mild medical clinical effects, such as 
“vitamins”, “amino acid”, and some “Chinese herb medicines” were often 
recommended by the doctors. A pharmaceutical sales representative gave an example 
for the prescribing traditional Chinese medicines and medicines for recovery.  
“The most widely used medicine in my company is X. It could be used on a lot 
of diseases, for recovery. Drug remuneration is around 20% of the retail 
price… You may not need it, but anyway, it will not kill you (so doctors will 
prescribe it)…” (Pharmaceutical sales representative) 
 
Interestingly, most pharmaceutical companies did not see their marketing strategies 
as inappropriate or illicit. A pharmaceutical sales representative noted: 
“I do not think drug remuneration practice is wrong. Look at these products 
listed in supermarkets. A good merchandising also needs merchandising fees 
to put their products in the best place on shelf. It is the same with drug sales. 
The major difference between drug sales and products in a supermarket is 
that the decision of what drug to prescribe is made by the doctor. Because of 
13 
 
this, pharmaceutical salesman needs to do whatever he can to persuade the 
doctors to sell the drug.” (Pharmaceutical sales representative)  
 
The arguments made by these pharmaceutical sales representatives rested largely on 
the point that selling drugs was a business similar to selling products in a 
supermarket. Efficacy of the drug was largely overlooked, and most of the marketing 
strategies were based on the economic incentives of drug prescription. 
 
3.4 Policies aiming at regulating drug remunerations 
It would be unfair to say that the government has no intention to regulate the troubled 
pharmaceutical market. As healthcare costs increase dramatically, the Chinese 
government is determined to cut healthcare costs by focusing on over-priced drugs. 
The drug policy reform aimed at controlling healthcare cost emerged as a significant 
force shaping China’s pharmaceutical industry and ways of drug marketing. A set of 
complex and comprehensive policies towards pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical industries were established. The launch of the ‘Drug Purchasing 
Mechanism’ was a good example. Drugs with the same chemical formula needed to 
go through a ‘Purchasing Mechanism’, and those had the lowest prices can be listed 
in hospital. The purchasing mechanism was designed to reduce hospital 
administrators’ backdoor dealings when purchasing from drug companies. Besides, it 
was believed that doctors would have less commercial incentive to over-prescribe or 
to choose costly medicines over affordable ones when having fewer options of 
pharmaceutical products listed in hospitals.Unsurprisingly, the implementation of the 
policy was also sluggish and difficult, because “the reduction of retail prices harmed 
the interest of the hospitals and the pharmaceutical companies” (Hospital director). 
In response to the purchasing mechanism, pharmaceutical companies developed 
strategies to response to the price control, such as “changing the regular product 
package”, “Reducing the doses of the tablets in order to make the prices look 
smaller”, which make the prices very difficult to compare. (Pharmaceutical sales 
representative) 
 
Another policy initiative was to require hospitals to decouple drug sales from 
hospital revenue, and to distinguish between drug revenue and profit earned through 
medical services. The intention of the policy was to channel resources away from 
pharmaceutical sales, especially costly imported pharmaceuticals, into medical 
services in order to improve the quality of health care and prevent corruption in 
hospitals. Ironically, healthcare costs, especially pharmaceutical costs, continued to 
climb although the share of pharmaceutical revenue appeared to shrink. As noted by 
the informants, instead of prescribing fewer drugs, most hospitals increased the use 
of medical services and high-tech diagnostic tests to balance the share between the 
pharmaceutical sales and medical services. As one informant noted: 
“Pharmaceutical revenue is the major source for the hospitals 
income…hospital revenue includes pharmaceutical income, diagnostic 
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procedures fee, and basic fees… If pharmaceutical revenues are cut down, 
then we have to increase other fees or increase the use of other services, 
such as the use of various diagnostic procedures. This is what is happening 
now, and the healthcare costs will continue increase and remain high.” 
(Medical doctor) 
 
Similar accounts were provided by a government official: 
“Who dares to say it is a wrong policy (decoupling policies)? In order to 
follow the policy and to keep the profit of the hospital, hospitals may 
promote use of high-tech diagnostic procedures, special wards and other 
methods to increase non-pharmaceutical expense…but this does not really 
mean the total cost for medicine is decreasing. (Medical doctor) 
 
When asked whether such illicit practice can be regulated, an informant noted: 
“How to prevent the drug commissions? We have tried all what we can. 
You know, what drug doctor prescribe sometimes have some influence on 
hospital’s interest. If he prescribes more imported drugs, hospitals receive 
more profits. In this sense, hospitals do not have such motivation to 
regulate drug prescription.” (Hospital director)  
 
This response showed that since drug sales are important to the hospital, hospitals 
have less incentive to regulate the inappropriate prescription. Hospitals can barely 
maintain or develop itself if it did not provide care for profits.  
 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper provided an empirical investigation of the issue of over-prescription based 
on interview data from hospitals in Shanghai. Funding pressures translated into 
hospitals revenue regardless of efficacy or efficiency of prescription. Hospitals set 
revenue target for individual medical department and bonus schemes for doctors. 
Moreover, the business ties between the pharmaceutical companies and hospitals 
were even closer than before; the two interacted in a reciprocal manner to motivate 
drug prescription among patients to mutually benefit both parties. This study argued 
that the way that the Chinese healthcare system operates was based on the profit-
seeking principle because the system can barely maintain or develop itself if it did 
not provide care for profit.  
 
Over-prescription and its link with provider payment incentives has been 
documented in a number of studies. A study of the use of medicines in Tuberculosis 
(TB) treatment reported that pressure from the doctors to generate revenue through 
selling medicines and services was one main reason that some TB patients fail to 
have access to treatment (Liu et al. 2007, 1464-1471). Ng (2011, 428-439), using 
data in hospitals in Guangdong Provinces from 2004 to 2008, suggested that 
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unnecessary care, over-prescription of drugs, and the adoption of high-tech 
treatments were common practice to drive revenues. Similarly, a study conducted in 
Beijing, Gansu, Shandong, and Henan showed that hospitals still regarded high-tech 
diagnostic services as profitable, and overuse of expensive treatment was still 
prevailing (Eggleston, Li et al. 2008). Similar findings were also demonstrated by 
Reynolds and McKee (2009, 32-36), who found that the treatment of common colds 
using injected medications of no therapeutic relevance has been fostered by the 
profit-led financing mechanism of the Chinese hospitals. Liu et al. (2011, 28-41) 
suggested that about 30% to 40% of drug consumption were deemed as inappropriate 
and were prescribed in an attempt to generate revenue for the hospital. Yang and Wu 
(2014) also found that the availability of insurance increased per episode costs for 
outpatient care; this increase was more pronounced among village clinics and 
township health centres—the backbone of the health system for rural residents—than 
at county and municipal hospitals. 
 
The problem of over-prescription and overly use of health services in hospitals 
deserve attention. It may seem appealing for the government to simply inject more 
funding to the health care sector. However, the danger is that provider behaviours 
that escalate costs may again necessitate further subsidies. Scholars suggested a few 
potential packages for correcting incentives of over-prescription, which include drug 
price control, strengthen provider-payment reforms, improving provider management, 
etc (Yip and Hsiao 2009, 613-619; Wagstaff et al. 2009, S7-S23; Yip et al. 2012, 
833-842; Ramesh, Wu, and HE 2012). Yet, in the case of China, even though the 
government is well aware of such problem and has launched several policy initiatives 
to control it, these initiatives  have met with little success (Eggleston, Li et al. 2008). 
For instance, a study assessing the “decoupling policy” which aimed to decouple 
drug sales from hospital revenues showed that the reform was not successful. Drug 
costs increased rapidly soon after the reform, since hospitals were able to shift the 
drug costs to other costs that were not controlled. The study concluded that 
improvement of rational use of drugs and correcting the incentive structure for 
hospitals and medical doctors were important to contain costs.(Meng et al. 2005, 
185-196). Zero mark-up of drug profit was launched in a number of provinces to 
squeeze the excessive profits in drug sales. However, evidence showed that although 
reduction in drug revenues was observed during the study period, costs for other 
health services increased, this was mainly because health care providers found new, 
potentially inappropriate, forms of revenue—service provision—to compensate for 
the loss of drug profits (Yi et al. 2015, 1391-1398; Xu 2010, 336; Wang and Cai 
2015, 56; Zhang et al. 2014, 6).  Evidence on the effectiveness of Centralised Drug 
Purchasing Mechanism, which was introduced to promote competitions among 
pharmaceutical companies and control drug prices, were also mixed. Scholars argued 
that hospitals still wield great power in deciding what drug to be used in their 
pharmacies because not all drugs need to go through the purchasing process (Wang, 
Mao, and Du 2015, 21; Peiming, Lili, and Shumei 2010, 51). Moreover, the pilot 
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policy interventions of clinical pathway reform, which was introduced as an 
instrumental to increase efficiency in resource use and control costs, also appeared to 
be ineffective (He and Yang 2015, 394-411).  
 
The Chinese government seems to be ambitious about reforming the current 
healthcare delivery system and to provide a more adequate healthcare system backed 
by more budgetary resources. However, for the various healthcare policies, 
campaigns, and mechanisms initiated in the past two decades aiming at overcoming 
provider payment incentives and containing drug costs, very few has been effective. 
The successful implementation of any effective policies is reliant on the 
government’s determination to correct the endogenous structural problem of the 
health care system, and initiate a thorough reform of provider payment incentives—
the fundamental causes for the sluggish implementation of most health policies. The 
decreased reliance on government funding, decentralisation of health care services, 
increased autonomy of health providers, and lack of effective regulatory framework 
in the local government further complicate the scenario. How to motivate the local 
and regional bureaucrats to effectively implement the legal stipulations to regulate 
provider behaviours, and how to regulate the pharmaceutical industry, are core 
questions that remain unanswered.  
 
The study results need to be interpreted in light with the limitations. The scope of the 
research is limited to interviews of health care stakeholders and their narrative 
accounts. Although the issue of over-prescription has been widely noted in the 
context of China’s healthcare system, the scope of the study is limited to Shanghai. 
Therefore, any generalisations of the study finds should be made with caution.  
 
Footnote: 
1 Hospitals in China adopt a three-tiered healthcare delivery structure, which is 
categorised by size of the hospital. A hospital’s ranking determines government 
subsidies, staff salaries, and other allowances. Class III is the highest tier. 
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Table 1. Key informants profile 
Groups Numbers Sample  
Medical doctors 4 One cardiologist from city hospital, 
two surgeons from district hospital, 
and one physician from township 
hospital.  
Pharmaceutical sales 
representatives 
4 Two pharmaceutical sales 
representatives from foreign 
pharmaceutical companies, and two 
from domestic companies.  
Hospital directors or 
management level from related 
health care departments and 
hospitals 
5 One hospital director from city 
hospital, two hospital directors from 
district hospitals, three managers of 
medical departments.  
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Figure 1 Incentives and strategies of different stakeholders 
Hospital level 
Incentives:
1. Insufficient 
fundings from the 
government;
2. Rising 
operational costs;
Strategies:
Establishing 
department revenue 
target system 
Medical 
department level 
Incentives: 
Revenue pressures 
from hospital level
Strategies:
Establishing bonus 
system among 
doctors  
Doctor level
Incentives:
1. Bonus system and 
revenue target from 
hospitals;
2. Drug remuneration 
from pharmacuetical 
companines;
3. Low pay and high 
workload;
Strategies:
1. Over-
prescribing 
medicines;
2. Over-providing 
medical services; 
Pharmacutical 
company level
Incentives:
1. High profits of 
drugs;
2. Overlooking the 
efficacy and cost-
effectiveness of a 
drug;  
Strategies:
1. Developing 
business relationship 
with hospital staff;
2. Offering drug 
remunerations 
 
 
 
